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Generally, risk management is the process of measuring, or assessing risk and then developing strategies to manage the risk. In general, the strategies employed include transferring the risk to another party, avoiding the risk, reducing the negative affect of the risk, and accepting some or all of the consequences of a particular risk. Traditional risk management, which is discussed here, focus on risks stemming from physical or legal causes (e.g. natural disasters or fires, accidents, death, and lawsuits). Financial risk management, on the other hand, focuses on risks that can be managed using traded financial instruments. Regardless of the type of risk management, all large corporations have risk management teams and small groups and corporations practice informal, if not formal, risk management.

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The Risk Issue / Spring 2007 / The Rotman School

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The Rotman School has set out to redesign business education for the 21st century and become one of the world's top-tier business schools. The School is developing an innovative curriculum built around Integrative ThinkingTM and Business DesignTM.

Underestimating the Risk of the Status Quo
Canadian firms are profoundly influenced by our capital markets’ narrow definition of ‘risky behaviour,’ and the unfortunate result is a dearth of globally-competitive companies.
Countering the Biggest Risk of All
How to anticipate and manage strategic threats systematically – and in the process, turn some of them into growth opportunities.
Bounded Awareness
People tend to overestimate their own awareness and underestimate its bounds. As a result, they often overlook information that is crucial to making successful decisions.
How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability
Risk expert Erwann Michel-Kerjan explains how our increasing interconnectedness breeds risk, and why the private sector must take a leadership role in assuring a safer environment.
Hull’s Laws: What We Can Learn from Derivatives Mishaps
High profile losses have made people wary of derivatives, which is unfortunate, because they can provide a very efficient way to manage risks.
A Primer on the Management of Risk and Uncertainty
Effective risk management involves preparing for ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns.’ Here’s how to get started.
Dancing with Strangers
While maintaining ties with ‘safe’ past partners stabilizes inter-organizational networks, non-local ties with ‘strangers’ can sow the seeds of network change and innovation.
Achieving Optimal Agreements
Focusing on promoting success rather than preventing failures is a powerful tool for achieving one’s goals at the bargaining table.
Embracing Risk to Learn, Grow and Innovate
In the world of ‘design thinking,’ acknowledging risk is the first step towards taking action, and with action comes insight, evidence and real options.

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PBS: Spying on the Home Front / Domestic surveillance datalogging

Last night, PBS Frontline aired Spying on the Home Front, devoted to all the ways the US government is spying on us.

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9/11 has indelibly altered America in ways that people are now starting to earnestly question: not only perpetual orange alerts, barricades and body frisks at the airport, but greater government scrutiny of people's records and electronic surveillance of their communications. The watershed, officials tell FRONTLINE, was the government's shift after 9/11 to a strategy of pre-emption at home -- not just prosecuting terrorists for breaking the law, but trying to find and stop them before they strike.

President Bush described his anti-terrorist measures as narrow and targeted, but a FRONTLINE investigation has found that the National Security Agency (NSA) has engaged in wiretapping and sifting Internet communications of millions of Americans; the FBI conducted a data sweep on 250,000 Las Vegas vacationers, and along with more than 50 other agencies, they are mining commercial-sector data banks to an unprecedented degree.

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Even government officials with experience since 9/11 are nagged by anxiety about the jeopardy that a war without end against unseen terrorists poses to our way of life, our personal freedoms. "I always said, when I was in my position running counterterrorism operations for the FBI, 'How much security do you want, and how many rights do you want to give up?'" Larry Mefford, former assistant FBI director, tells Smith. "I can give you more security, but I've got to take away some rights. … Personally, I want to live in a country where you have a common-sense, fair balance, because I'm worried about people that are untrained, unsupervised, doing things with good intentions but, at the end of the day, harm our liberties."

Although the president told the nation that his NSA eavesdropping program was limited to known Al Qaeda agents or supporters abroad making calls into the U.S., comments of other administration officials and intelligence veterans indicate that the NSA cast its net far more widely. AT&T technician Mark Klein inadvertently discovered that the whole flow of Internet traffic in several AT&T operations centers was being regularly diverted to the NSA, a charge indirectly substantiated by John Yoo, the Justice Department lawyer who wrote the official legal memos legitimizing the president's warrantless wiretapping program. Yoo told FRONTLINE: "The government needs to have access to international communications so that it can try to find communications that are coming into the country where Al Qaeda's trying to send messages to cell members in the country. In order to do that, it does have to have access to communication networks."

Spying on the Home Front also looks at a massive FBI data sweep in December 2003. On a tip that Al Qaeda "might have an interest in Las Vegas" around New Year's 2004, the FBI demanded records from all hotels, airlines, rental car agencies, casinos and other businesses on every person who visited Las Vegas in the run-up to the holiday. Stephen Sprouse and Kristin Douglas of Kansas City, Mo., object to being caught in the FBI dragnet in Las Vegas just because they happened to get married there at the wrong moment. Says Douglas, "I'm sure that the government does a lot of things that I don't know about, and I've always been OK with that -- until I found out that I was included."

A check of all 250,000 Las Vegas visitors against terrorist watch lists turned up no known terrorist suspects or associates of suspects. The FBI told FRONTLINE that the records had been kept for more than two years, but have now all been destroyed.

In the broad reach of NSA eavesdropping, the massive FBI data sweep in Las Vegas, access to records gathered by private database companies that allows government agencies to avoid the limitations provided by the Privacy Act, and nearly 200 other government data-mining programs identified by the Government Accounting Office, experienced national security officials and government attorneys see a troubling and potentially dangerous collision between the strategy of pre-emption and the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizure.

Peter Swire, a law professor and former White House privacy adviser to President Clinton, tells FRONTLINE that since 9/11 the government has been moving away from the traditional legal standard of investigations based on individual suspicion to generalized suspicion. The new standard, Swire says, is: "Check everybody. Everybody is a suspect."

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Epistemology and Risk Management

Risk management is a serious business. Accordingly, the production of a risk “measure” must be subjected to the question “how do you know what you claim to know” – in other words, epistemology. Claims regarding risk cannot be made without any rigorously established supervision of their validity. There is a need for skeptical inquiries concerning how a risk measure was obtained and how an opinion was formed. The fields of economics, finance, and insurance, in spite of their reliance on mathematics, have so far produced unreliable risk measures, particularly with the highly quantitative Modern Portfolio Theory. Very little check has been made on the theoretical and practical fitness of the assertions by the researchers and practitioners. Further, the discipline of statistics, with its confirmatory orientation, falls severely prey to the problem of induction – where proof of one level of probability is assumed to be proof of another.

Now, if the field of risk studies and quantitative risk management lacks adequate supervision, the field of mainstream epistemology itself provides no help for a decision maker under uncertainty (we tried!).

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Beyond Fear: The Psychology of Security

Security is both a feeling and a reality. And they're not the same.

Most of the time, when the perception of security doesn't match the reality of security, it's because the perception of the risk doesn't match the reality of the risk. We worry about the wrong things: paying too much attention to minor risks and not enough attention to major ones. We don't correctly assess the magnitude of different risks. A lot of this can be chalked up to bad information or bad mathematics, but there are some general pathologies that come up over and over again.

  • People exaggerate spectacular but rare risks and downplay common risks.
  • People have trouble estimating risks for anything not exactly like their normal situation.
  • Personified risks are perceived to be greater than anonymous risks.
  • People underestimate risks they willingly take and overestimate risks in situations they can't control.
  • Last, people overestimate risks that are being talked about and remain an object of public scrutiny.

[ PDF ] view document » schneier.com

Risk2 Enterprise Solutions

In ideal risk management, a prioritization process is followed whereby the risks with the greatest loss and the greatest probability of occurring are handled first, and risks with lower probability of occurrence and lower loss are handled later. In practice the process can be very difficult, and balancing between risks with a high probability of occurrence but lower loss vs. a risk with high loss but lower probability of occurrence can often be mishandled.

Risk management also faces a difficulty in allocating resources properly. This is the idea of opportunity cost. Resources spent on risk management could be instead spent on more profitable activities. Again, ideal risk management spends the least amount of resources in the process while reducing the negative effects of risks as much as possible.

Steps in the risk management process

Identification

A first step in the process of managing risk is to identify potential risks. Risks are about events that, when triggered, will cause problems. Hence, risk identification can start with the source of problems, or with the problem itself.

  • Source Analysis Risk sources may be internal or external to the system that is the target of risk management. Examples of risk sources are: stakeholders of a project, employees of a company or the weather over an airport.
  • Problem Analysis Risks are related to fear. For example: the fear of losing money, the fear of abuse of privacy information or the fear of accidents and casualties. The fear may exist with various entities, most important with shareholder, customers and legislative bodies such as the government.

When either source or problem is known, the events that a source may trigger or the events that can lead to a problem can be investigated. For example: stakeholders withdrawing during a project may endanger funding of the project; privacy information may be stolen by employees even within a closed network; lightning striking a B747 during takeoff may make all people onboard immediate casualties.

The chosen method of identifying risks may depend on culture, industry practice and compliance. The identification methods are formed by templates or the development of templates for identifying source, problem or event. Common risk identification methods are:

  • Objectives-based Risk Identification Organizations and project teams have objectives. Any event that may endanger achieving an objective partly or completely is identified as risk. Objective-based risk identification is at the basis of COSO's Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework
  • Scenario-based Risk Identification In scenario analysis different scenarios are created. The scenarios may be the alternative ways to achieve an objective, or an analysis of the interaction of forces in, for example, a market or battle. Any event that triggers an undesired scenario alternative is identified as risk.
  • Taxonomy-based Risk Identification The taxonomy in taxonomy-based risk identification is a breakdown of possible risk sources. Based on the taxonomy and knowledge of best practices, a questionnaire is compiled. The answers to the questions reveal risks. Taxonomy-based risk identification in software industry can be found in CMU/SEI-93-TR-6.
  • Common-risk Checking In several industries lists with known risks are available. Each risk in the list can be checked for application to a particular situation. An example of known risks in the software industry is the Common Vulnerability and Exposures list.

Assessment

Once risks have been identified, they must then be assessed as to their potential severity of loss and to the probability of occurrence. These quantities can be either simple to measure, in the case of the value of a lost building, or impossible to know for sure in the case of the probability of an unlikely event occurring. Therefore, in the assessment process it is critical to make the best educated guesses possible in order to properly prioritize the implementation of the risk management plan.

Possible Actions Available

Once risks have been identified and assessed, all techniques to manage the risk fall into one or more of these four major categories:

  • Avoidance
  • Reduction (aka Mitigation)
  • Retention (aka Acceptance)
  • Transfer

Ideal use of these strategies may not be possible. Some of them may involve trade offs that are not acceptable to the organization or person making the risk management decisions.

Risk Avoidance
Includes not performing an activity that could carry risk. An example would be not buying a property or business in order to not take on the liability that comes with it. Another would be not flying in order to not take the risk that the airplane were to be hijacked. Avoidance may seem the answer to all risks, but avoiding risks also means losing out on the potential gain that accepting (retaining) the risk may have allowed. Not entering a business to avoid the risk of loss also avoids the possibility of earning the profits.

Risk Reduction
Involves methods that reduce the severity of the loss. Examples include sprinklers designed to put out a fire to reduce the risk of loss by fire. This method may cause a greater loss by water damage and therefore may not be suitable. Halon fire suppression systems may mitigate that risk, but the cost may be prohibitive as a strategy.

Modern software development methodologies reduce risk by developing and delivering software incrementally. Early methodologies suffered from the fact that they only delivered software in the final phase of development; any problems encountered in earlier phases meant costly rework and often jeopardized the whole project. By developing in increments, software projects can limit effort wasted to a single increment. A current trend in software development, spearheaded by the Extreme Programming community, is to reduce the size of increments to the smallest size possible, sometimes as little as one week is allocated to an increment.

Risk Retention
Involves accepting the loss when it occurs. True self insurance falls in this category. Risk retention is a viable strategy for small risks where the cost of insuring against the risk would be greater over time than the total losses sustained. All risks that are not avoided or transferred are retained by default. This includes risks that are so large or catastrophic that they either cannot be insured against or the premiums would be infeasible. War is an example since most property and risks are not insured against war, so the loss attributed by war is retained by the insured. Also any amounts of potential loss (risk) over the amount insured is retained risk. This may also be acceptable if the chance of a very large loss is small or if the cost to insure for greater coverage amounts is so great it would hinder the goals of the organization too much.

Risk Transfer
Means causing another party to accept the risk, typically by contract or by hedging. Insurance is one type of risk transfer that uses contracts. Other times it may involve contract language that transfers a risk to another party without the payment of an insurance premium. Liability among construction or other contractors is very often transferred this way. On the other hand, taking offsetting positions in derivative securities is typically how firms use hedging to financial risk management: financially manage risk.

Some ways of managing risk fall into multiple categories. Risk retention pools are technically retaining the risk for the group, but spreading it over the whole group involves transfer among individual members of the group. This is different from traditional insurance, in that no premium is exchanged between members of the group up front, but instead losses are assessed to all members of the group.

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